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NOTE
UNITED STATES v. PINEDA-MORENO:
TRACKING DOWN INDIVIDUALS’
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
“It may be said that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure.” 1

INTRODUCTION

The fantastic technological progress of the twenty-first century has
provided law enforcement with more efficient methods to fight crime,
pressing courts across the country to define the limits of what tactics the
government may employ before it has violated an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights. 2 Like many Americans, law enforcement agencies
are eager to purchase the newest and most advanced technologies. 3
1

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to the citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441
(1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (remarking “that the fantastic advances in the field of electronic
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; [and] that indiscriminate
use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance
that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive.”)
3
Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/.
2
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Among the devices that police agencies have adopted are Global
Positioning System (“GPS”) transmitters 4 to track the movement of
individuals. 5
By recording precise geographic locations, GPS
technology is an ideal alternative to visual surveillance of an individual’s
However, the constitutional implications of this
whereabouts. 6
technology on privacy in America are unresolved, since the Supreme
Court has not yet decided the issue. 7 As a result, we are left with the
question whether police use of such technological advancements has
propelled us into “the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to
surveillance at all times.” 8 As a court that covers one fifth of the
country’s population, the Ninth Circuit plays a major role in this
developing Fourth Amendment issue. 9 Recently, it confronted the
intersection of Fourth Amendment protections and law enforcement’s
use of GPS tracking devices in United States v. Pineda-Moreno. 10
In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged police
monitoring of a defendant’s precise location through the use of GPS
transmitters did not constitute a search. 11 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit

4

A GPS transmitter “records the date, time, latitude and longitude of the transmitter in
programmed intervals of two to three minutes each time the GPS device moves. The GPS transmitter
is approximately the size of a pack of cigarettes, and is powered by batteries, which last
approximately two to three weeks. The GPS transmitter has a cellular modem component that
permits remote access to the stored tracking information and current location of the transmitter.”
Morton v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 05-CV-4000 (SJF)(AKT), 2007 WL 4264569, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007).
5
Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug.
13,
2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html.
6
Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/; see Ben Hubbard,
Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 13, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html
(noting that officers argue that “GPS is essentially the same as having an officer trail someone, just
cheaper and more accurate”).
7
April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 674 (2005); see Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The Government Knows Where
You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 103, 107 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has made no decision regarding GPS
technology).
8
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9
See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Adam Cohen, The Government’s New Right to Track
Aug.
25,
2010,
Your
Every
Move
With
GPS,
TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2013150,00.html.
10
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
11
Id. at 1217.
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relied on the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Knotts. 12 Knotts
held that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another.” 13 Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in PinedaMoreno, most federal appellate courts interpreted Knotts to hold that
location tracking outside the home is analogous to physical surveillance
and therefore does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 14 Since Pineda-Moreno, however, other courts have
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and have held that prolonged GPS
monitoring of a defendant’s movements does constitute a search. 15
Part I of this Note presents the facts and procedural history of
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, followed by a discussion of relevant
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, highlighting the Supreme Court’s
public-exposure doctrine as described in United States v. Knotts. Part II
argues that the Ninth Circuit based its decision in Pineda-Moreno on the
precise issue the Supreme Court declined to decide in Knotts: whether
prolonged twenty-four-hour electronic surveillance of an individual
constitutes a search. In Part III, this Note goes on to analyze how the
Ninth Circuit’s misinterpretation of the Knotts holding compelled it to
prematurely reject Pineda-Moreno’s Fourth Amendment claim without
analyzing whether he had a justifiable expectation of privacy. Part IV
concludes that law enforcement’s use of GPS technology to monitor
Pineda-Moreno’s movements over the course of four months constituted
a search because it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. In
Part V, this Note proposes a practical two-step analysis that balances the
Supreme Court’s public-exposure doctrine with the privacy interest at
stake when the government utilizes advanced technology, like GPS
tracking, to conduct comprehensive surveillance of an individual.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Ninth Circuit decided two issues in Pineda-Moreno: first,
whether Pineda-Moreno possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the undercarriage of his vehicle when it was parked in his driveway, on
the street, or in a public parking lot; 16 and second, whether the use of
12

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 282.
14
See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
15
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671
(2010).
16
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010).
13
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GPS devices to monitor the totality of Pineda-Moreno’s movements in
his vehicle over the course of four months constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 17
A.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V.
PINEDA-MORENO

While shopping at a Home Depot on May 28, 2007, a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent noticed a group of men
purchasing a large quantity of fertilizer. 18 The agent recognized the
fertilizer as a type commonly used to grow marijuana. 19 The men left the
store in a 1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee, later identified as belonging to
Juan Pineda-Moreno. 20
Over the next month, Pineda-Moreno and his partners purchased
irrigation equipment and a large quantity of groceries, using his vehicle
on several of these occasions. 21 After the men purchased a large amount
of groceries for the second time, store security staff alerted the police,
who followed the men back to Pineda-Moreno’s rental mobile home. 22
Agents began surveillance of Pineda-Moreno’s home. 23 On seven
different occasions, agents installed three types of mobile tracking
devices onto the undercarriage of Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle without a
warrant: four times while his Jeep was parked on a public street in front
of his trailer, twice while it was parked in his driveway, just a few feet
from his home, and once while it was parked in a public parking lot. 24
Using these mobile tracking devices, agents monitored the location
of Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle over the course of four months. 25 Two of
the devices used GPS technology that relayed the exact location of the
vehicle to police. 26 The other device was a cell phone that transmitted
signals to cell-phone towers. 27
Agents could remotely access
17

Id. at 1216-17.
Opening Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260.
19
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Opening Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260.
23
Id.
24
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260.
18
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information collected by the devices; the devices could also store the
data, which police would then download to a computer after removing
the device from Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle. 28
Alerted by one of the mobile tracking devices that Juan PinedaMoreno’s Jeep was leaving a suspected marijuana grow site, DEA agents
followed and pulled over Pineda-Moreno. 29 During this stop, the agents
noticed the odor of marijuana coming from a passenger in the backseat. 30
An immigration agent arrived to interview the men in Spanish and
determined that the men were in the United States illegally. 31 He
obtained consent from Pineda-Moreno to search both his vehicle and
home. 32 The agents found two garbage bags of marijuana, as well as
some other, smaller packages of marijuana, 33 comprising a total of
approximately twenty-nine pounds. 34
A grand jury indicted Pineda-Moreno on one count of conspiracy to
manufacture marijuana and one count of manufacturing marijuana. 35
Pineda-Moreno moved to suppress the evidence collected by the mobile
tracking devices. 36 He argued that the government invaded an area in
which he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when they
installed the devices onto the undercarriage of his vehicle, thereby
violating his Fourth Amendment rights. 37 The district court denied his
motion to suppress, concluding that Pineda-Moreno had no legitimate
expectation of privacy because the agents installed the devices when his
vehicle was parked in his open driveway, on the street and in a public

28

Id.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214.
30
Id. at 1214; Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260.
31
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214; Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260.
32
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214; Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260.
33
Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260.
34
Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 0830385), 2009 WL 4611261.
35
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214; see 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vii), 846(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A)(vii) (Westlaw 2011).
36
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214.
37
Id. Defendant did not argue that the agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
monitoring his vehicle’s movements with the tracking devices until he appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress. Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611261.
29
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parking lot. 38 Pineda-Moreno entered a conditional guilty plea and
reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 39
1.

Installation of GPS Tracking Devices as an Invasion of Privacy

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of PinedaMoreno’s motion to suppress. 40 It held that the government did not
violate Pineda-Moreno’s Fourth Amendment rights by affixing mobile
tracking devices, without a warrant, to the underside of his vehicle when
it was parked in his driveway, on a public street, and in a parking lot. 41
The court reasoned that Pineda-Moreno did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of his vehicle or in any of the
areas in which agents attached the devices to his parked vehicle. 42 Since
the court determined that Pineda-Moreno had no legitimate expectation
of privacy, the government did not conduct a search when they attached
the devices to his vehicle without a warrant; 43 therefore, Pineda-Moreno
could claim no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 44
2.

Extended Monitoring as a “Search”

On appeal, Pineda-Moreno argued that the government’s use of the
devices to monitor the movements of his vehicle over an extended period
of time constituted an unreasonable search, thereby violating his Fourth
Amendment rights. 45 The Ninth Circuit concluded that this argument did

38

Brief of Appellee, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 0830385), 2009 WL 4611261.
39
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214.
40
Id. at 1217.
41
Id. at 1214-15.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1215.
44
Id. This Case Note will not address the issue of the installation of the tracking devices or
the court’s reasoning behind its finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation; instead, it
will focus on the court’s determination that extended police monitoring of Pineda-Moreno’s
movements did not constitute a search and therefore did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
45
Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611260. Since Pineda-Moreno did not raise this specific ground in
the district court, the government contended that the Ninth Circuit should review the district court’s
decision only for plain error. Conversely, Pineda-Moreno argued that a de novo standard of review
should be applied on two bases: first, his motion to suppress was broad enough to cover such a
challenge; and second, the government broadly addressed the use of the device in its response to his
motion so that the issue was brought to the court’s attention. The Ninth Circuit did not resolve this
dispute, concluding that under either standard, the district court committed no error in denying his
motion to suppress. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
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not present a valid ground for granting his motion to suppress. 46 The
court held that police did not conduct a search by monitoring PinedaMoreno’s travels through the use of tracking devices over a four-month
period, because he did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy in his
movements on public roads. 47 To reach this conclusion, the court
examined Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the
circumstances in which a defendant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his or her vehicle’s movements. 48
B.

RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 49

According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution entitles each person “to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.” 50 However, before determining
whether a search was “reasonable,” and evaluating the ramifications of
that determination on the admissibility of the evidence produced, 51 the
critical threshold inquiry is whether a search ever occurred. 52
1.

Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine

To qualify as a search, and therefore implicate the Fourth
Amendment and its protections, two conditions must be fulfilled. First,
the government must be performing the search; the Fourth Amendment

46

See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217.
See id.; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
48
See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216-17.
49
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
51
If the evidence is obtained through an illegal (i.e., unreasonable) search or seizure, then the
remedy is the exclusion of that evidence. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding
that evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in federal courts); see also
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained through illegal searches and
seizures is inadmissible in state courts).
52
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
745-46 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
47
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does not extend its protections to searches performed by private actors. 53
Second, according to the test articulated in Katz v. United States, the
government must have conducted the search in an area in which an
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 54
While there is no bright-line rule indicating whether an expectation
of privacy is one that society will accept as reasonable, whether that
“expectation relates to information that has been ‘exposed to the public’”
is significant to the analysis. 55 Under the Supreme Court’s publicexposure doctrine, an individual generally does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her activities that he or she exposes to the
public. 56 Following this doctrine, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Knotts, 57 the seminal case that influences—if not controls—
cases in which law enforcement uses electronic surveillance to track
defendants’ locations. 58
2.

United States v. Knotts

In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that law
enforcement does not conduct a search by using a beeper 59 to track a
vehicle because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
53

Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (2010) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
56
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists inside a home); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a fenced-in backyard since it was visible to the public
from a plane flying overhead); Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-16 (holding an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an object’s movements within a home, since they were not visible to the
public); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-84 (1983) (holding an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements over public roads); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (holding an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
phone numbers dialed from a private telephone since the numbers were conveyed to the telephone
company, a third party outside the home); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “what a person knowingly exposes to the public,” but it
may protect what that person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public.”).
57
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (noting movements observed by police were “voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look”).
58
See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Knotts is controlling on the issue of
prolonged electronic surveillance of an individual); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th
Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
671 (2010).
59
As defined by the Supreme Court, “a beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
54
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thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.” 60 In Knotts, police planted a beeper in a
container of chemicals before one of Knotts’s co-conspirators purchased
it. 61 Using the beeper, the police followed the car carrying the device
about 100 miles from the container’s place of purchase to Knotts’s
cabin. 62 Relying on the signal from the beeper, and intermittent visual
surveillance of the cabin, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search
the cabin, eventually discovering a drug laboratory inside. 63 The Court
held that police monitoring of the beeper over public roads did not
constitute a search, because the driver “voluntarily conveyed to anyone
who wanted to look” the direction of his travels, his destination, and any
stops he made along the way. 64 In other words, the driver knowingly
exposed his whereabouts to the public, thereby relinquishing any
reasonable expectation of privacy in his travels and destination. 65
Federal appellate courts have uniformly interpreted Knotts as
holding that location tracking outside the home is analogous to physical
surveillance. 66 However, the circuits have issued conflicting decisions
concerning whether this holding extends to prolonged electronic
surveillance. 67 More specifically, the circuits are in disagreement over
whether Knotts left unanswered the issue of prolonged surveillance or
mass surveillance. 68

60

Id. at 281.
Id. at 278.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 279.
64
Id. at 281-82.
65
Id. at 282.
66
See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir.
2007).
67
Compare Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (deciding that no search took place when law
enforcement used a GPS to track a drug trafficking operation’s truck) and Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d
at 1216-17 (police did not conduct a search of the defendant's car by warrantless monitoring for of
its movements over two months through GPS devices) and Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996 (holding no
search or seizure when police retrieved car's travel history from GPS device placed on car’s
undercarriage) with United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
671 (2010) (holding prolonged GPS-monitoring of vehicle’s travels constituted a Fourth
Amendment search).
68
Compare Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (leaving open the question whether “mass” electronic
surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, requiring a warrant) and PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (reserving the issue of “mass” electronic surveillance) and Garcia, 474
F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Knotts Court reserved the issue of “mass” electronic
surveillance) with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 (noting that the Knotts Court pointedly declined to
decide the issue of prolonged, twenty-four hour electronic surveillance of an individual).
61
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THE NINTH CIRCUIT BASED ITS DECISION ON AN INCORRECT
UNDERSTANDING OF KNOTTS

In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit held that law enforcement’s
prolonged and warrantless use of GPS tracking devices to monitor the
defendant’s vehicle’s movements did not constitute a search and
therefore was not subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. 69 The court arrived at this conclusion based on its analysis
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Knotts v. United States; 70 however,
the court’s analysis failed to account for the limited scope of the Knotts
holding. As a result, the Ninth Circuit based its decision in PinedaMoreno on the precise issue the Supreme Court declined to decide in
Knotts: whether prolonged twenty-four-hour electronic surveillance of an
individual constitutes a search.
A.

THE PINEDA-MORENO COURT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE LIMITED
HOLDING IN KNOTTS

By analogy, the Ninth Circuit determined that the facts of PinedaMoreno fell squarely within the Knotts decision. 71 It reasoned that, in
both cases, technology provided police with a substitute for following the
defendants’ vehicles on public streets, and “the only information the
agents obtained from the tracking devices was a log of the locations
where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled, information the agents could have
obtained by following the car.” 72 Like the beeper in Knotts, the court
reasoned, the GPS device merely provided police with a more efficient
form of tracking Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle on public streets. 73 Since the
Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from “augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case,” 74 the court deduced
that following a car on a public street is not a search. 75 Thus, according
to the Ninth Circuit, the GPS devices attached to the defendant’s vehicle
merely provided an efficient substitute for police to follow PinedaMoreno’s Jeep on public roads—an activity that falls outside the scope

69

Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217.
See id. at 1216.
71
See id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)).
75
Id. at 1217 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007)).
70
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of the Fourth Amendment. 76 Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Pineda-Moreno was factually analogous to Knotts, a closer look reveals
that the Supreme Court actually reserved the exact issue posed in
Pineda-Moreno.
1.

The Knotts Court Declined to Analyze the Issue of Prolonged
Surveillance

The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Knotts holding as conclusive
authority concerning the issue of prolonged surveillance. 77 However, as
the language of the Knotts opinion established, the Court actually
declined to analyze whether prolonged surveillance of an individual by
the government constitutes a search cognizable under the Fourth
Amendment. 78
In Knotts, the Court reserved the issue of whether a warrant would
be required in a case that involved twenty-four-hour surveillance. 79 The
Court stated, “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable.” 80 By reserving the issue of “dragnet” practices, the Court
referred directly to Knotts’s contention that prolonged “twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without
judicial knowledge or supervision.” 81 In other words, the Court
explicitly rejected Knotts’s concern that its decision would lead to the
endorsement of warrantless twenty-four-hour tracking of individuals. 82
Thus, contrary to what the Ninth Circuit concluded in Pineda-Moreno,

76

Id. at 1216.
Citing the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Garcia, the Pineda-Moreno court wrote that
“[s]hould [the] government someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular
movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted
to treat such surveillance as a search.” Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 n.2.
78
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010);
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007); see also United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983).
79
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84 (1983).
80
Id. at 284.
81
Id. at 283 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 9-10, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983) (No. 81-1802)). The quoted section of the defendant’s brief stated, “we respectfully submit
that the Court should remain mindful that should it adopt the result maintained by the government,
twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial
knowledge or supervision.”
82
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558; see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283.
77
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the Court did not decide whether prolonged twenty-four-hour monitoring
constituted a search, thereby limiting its holding to the facts before it. 83
However, the Ninth Circuit did not interpret this passage in the
Knotts decision to mean that the Court declined to decide the issue of
prolonged twenty-four-hour surveillance; rather, it reasoned that the
Court reserved the issue of “mass” electronic surveillance, apparently
based on the Court’s use of the term “dragnet.” 84 Although the PinedaMoreno court did not define “mass” electronic surveillance, it referred to
another circuit’s decision that defined the issue as tracking the
movements of numerous vehicles. 85
2.

Other Courts Acknowledge That Knotts Did Not Decide the Issue of
Prolonged Surveillance

Since the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pineda-Moreno, the D.C.
Circuit concluded that the Knotts Court pointedly declined to evaluate
whether prolonged electronic tracking constituted a search. 86 In United
States v. Maynard, the D.C. Circuit resoundingly rejected the notion that
what the Knotts Court left unanswered was the question “whether
‘wholesale’ or ‘mass’ electronic surveillance of many individuals
requires a warrant.” 87 While the court did not dispute that a defendant
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements during
a discrete journey under Knotts, it observed that the Supreme Court
specifically avoided holding that the Fourth Amendment condoned
prolonged warrantless location tracking. 88 Applying this understanding
of Knotts to the case before it, the D.C. Circuit held that police violated
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they monitored a
GPS device attached to his vehicle around-the-clock for twenty-eight

83

Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283).
The Pineda-Moreno court wrote that “[s]hould [the] government someday decide to
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.” United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010).
85
When the Pineda-Moreno court reserved the issue of mass surveillance, it cited the
Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Garcia. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (9th Cir.
2010). In Garcia, the court similarly reserved the issue mass government electronic surveillance of
vehicular movements after envisioning a hypothetical law requiring all new cars to come equipped
with a GPS device so that the government could track all vehicular movement. United States v.
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
86
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671
(2010); see also Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217.
87
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
88
Id. at 556.
84
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days. 89 The court concluded that in doing so, law enforcement
conducted a search. 90
Likewise, other courts have recognized that the Supreme Court did
not decide the issue of unlimited and prolonged government electronic
surveillance of individuals. In United States v. Butts, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized the limited police use of a signal device to track the
defendant, writing “[a]s did the Supreme Court in Knotts, we pretermit
any ruling on worst-case situations that may involve persistent, extended,
or unlimited violations of a warrant’s terms.” 91 Additionally, the New
York Court of Appeals pointed out in People v. Weaver that Knotts
concerned a “single trip” and the Court specifically reserved the issue of
Therefore, “[a]ccording to the
twenty-four-hour surveillance. 92
[Supreme] Court, its decision [in Knotts] should not be read to sanction
‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.’” 93
At least two district courts have adopted the Maynard interpretation
of the Knotts holding. 94 Like the D.C. Circuit in Maynard, the Eastern
District of New York and the Southern District of Texas also noted that
Knotts is not dispositive on the issue of prolonged tracking. 95 Based in
part on this determination, the courts denied the government’s requests
for access to several months’ worth of historical cell-site location
records. 96
Alternatively, circuit precedent (as well as a number of district-court
decisions), 97 supports the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Knotts; 98
89

Id.
Id.
91
United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984).
92
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1198-201 (N.Y. 2009).
93
Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007).
94
See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, NOS. H-10-998M, H-10981M, 2010 WL 4286365, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010); see also In re Application of the U.S. for
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-0897 (JO), 2010 WL
5437209, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010).
95
See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, NOS. H-10-998M, H-10981M, 2010 WL 4286365, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010); see also In re Application of the U.S. for
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-0897 (JO), 2010 WL
5437209, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010).
96
See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, NOS. H-10-998M, H-10981M, 2010 WL 4286365, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010); see also In re Application of the U.S. for
an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-0897 (JO), 2010 WL
5437209, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010).
97
See, e.g., United States v. Walker, No. 2:10-cr-32, 2011 WL 651414, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 11, 2011) (concluding that police did not conduct a search by monitoring signals from a GPS
attached to the defendants car because the defendant “knowingly exposed her vehicle's location to
the public when she drove on public roads”); United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, 2010
90
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however, this precedent is similarly flawed. Prior to the Pineda-Moreno
decision, two circuits held that the use of a GPS tracking device to
monitor an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged
period was not a search. 99 In United States v. Garcia, the Seventh
Circuit read Knotts to endorse all “tracking of a vehicle on public
streets.” 100 In United States v. Marquez, the Eighth Circuit came to the
same conclusion in a similar case. 101 After holding that the defendant
had no standing to challenge the use of the GPS device, that court noted
that, even if he did have standing, no search took place when law
enforcement used the device to track a drug trafficking operation’s
truck. 102 Like the Ninth Circuit in Pineda-Moreno, both courts identified
and declined to decide the same issue they mistakenly believed the
Supreme Court left open in Knotts: whether “mass” electronic
surveillance required a warrant. 103 These courts did not recognize that
the Supreme Court drew a distinction in Knotts between short-term and
prolonged surveillance—not the issue of “mass” surveillance of multiple
individuals. 104
The Ninth Circuit faced the precise issue the Supreme Court
reserved in Knotts: whether prolonged electronic surveillance by the
government constitutes a search. 105 In Pineda-Moreno, law enforcement
monitored the defendant’s whereabouts twenty-four hours a day for four
months. 106 Like Maynard and other courts that faced similar issues, the
WL 4595522, at *6 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010) (holding the monitoring of a GPS device attached to
undercarriage of defendant’s vehicle did not implicate Fourth Amendment protections); United
States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010)
(holding government monitoring of a GPS device placed on defendant’s van did not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1307-08 (N.D.
Fla. 2010) (holding monitoring of GPS device placed on defendant's vehicle did not violate his
Fourth Amendment rights since he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s
movements); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the
warrantless use of a GPS device to track the defendant's vehicle did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the defendant had no expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s travels on public
roads).
98
See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
99
See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
100
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671
(2010); see Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996.
101
Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610.
102
Id.
103
See id.; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
104
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564-65.
105
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
106
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213.
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Ninth Circuit should have recognized the limited holding of Knotts. 107
Accordingly, the court should have then proceeded to analyze whether
Pineda-Moreno had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements over time. 108 Instead, by failing to recognize that the facts
presented in Pineda-Moreno fell outside the scope of the Knotts holding,
the Ninth Circuit prematurely ended its analysis of Pineda-Moreno’s
Fourth Amendment claim.
III. PROLONGED GPS MONITORING REVEALS AN INTIMATE PICTURE OF
THE SUBJECT’S LIFE
Like the courts in Knotts and Maynard, the Ninth Circuit should
have “explicitly distinguished between the limited information
discovered by use of [a] beeper—movements during a discrete journey—
and more comprehensive or sustained monitoring at issue in [PinedaMoreno].” 109 This analysis involves two issues: the duration of the
electronic monitoring and the GPS technology that enabled such
surveillance. On both of these issues, the facts of Knotts are entirely
distinguishable from those in Pineda-Moreno. In fact, the prolonged
GPS tracking involved in Pineda-Moreno revealed fundamentally
different information from that collected during the short-term
surveillance enabled by the beeper used in Knotts. 110 However, the
Ninth Circuit addressed neither of these issues, thereby precluding the
court from finding that Pineda-Moreno had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the totality of his movements.
A.

DURATION OF TRACKING

The Knotts Court emphasized the limited information law
enforcement collected by following signals that were emitted from the
beeper placed in the defendant’s vehicle during a single 100-mile trip. 111
In particular, the Court carefully noted the “limited use which the
107

See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671

(2010).
108

Id. at 564-65 (concluding that Knotts was not dispositive on the issue of prolonged
surveillance, the D.C. Circuit proceeded to analyze whether the defendant had an expectation of
privacy in his movements that society recognized as reasonable).
109
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1983)).
110
Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (using signals relayed from a beeper placed in a
container of chemicals placed in the vehicle, police tracked its route for approximately 100 miles
during one discrete trip) with Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213 (agents tracked Pineda-Moreno’s
vehicle’s movements over the course of four months using GPS).
111
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85.
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government made of the signals from this particular beeper” and
explained that “nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was
received or relied upon after it had indicated that the [container] had
ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent’s premises.” 112 In
part, these observations led the Court to conclude that police did not
conduct a search when they followed the driver from one location to
another just 100 miles away by monitoring signals relayed by the beeper
attached to the vehicle. 113 Thus, the Court emphasized the limited use of
the beeper by highlighting the fact that law enforcement used it only to
track the defendant’s travels during one discrete trip. 114
The D.C. Circuit adopted the Supreme Court’s distinction between
short- and long-term surveillance when analyzing whether electronic
surveillance constituted a search in United States v. Maynard. 115 In its
analysis, that court highlighted the fact that police tracked the
defendant’s movements twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight days—
not just during one trip, as was the case in Knotts. 116 As a result, that
court concluded,
[T]he police used the GPS device not to track [the driver’s]
“movements from one place to another,” . . . but rather to track [the
driver’s] movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he moved among
scores of places, thereby discovering the totality and pattern of his
movements from place to place to place. 117

Consequently, the Maynard court recognized that the amount and type of
information revealed by the GPS tracking in the case before it greatly
exceeded that gathered in Knotts. 118 The court reasoned that an isolated
trip reveals only limited information about the driver; in contrast,
prolonged surveillance exposes patterns in a driver’s movements from
which onlookers can easily infer the private activities, interests, and
relationships of the subject. 119 This recognition of the fundamental
difference between the information gathered in Knotts and that acquired
in Maynard caused the D.C. Circuit to conclude that law enforcement did
112

Id. The Supreme Court also emphasized the fact that law enforcement never monitored the
signal from the interior of the defendant’s cabin. Id. at 284.
113
Id. at 285.
114
See id.
115
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556-58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
671 (2010).
116
See id. at 558.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 562.
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conduct a search. 120
Unlike the Supreme Court in Knotts and the D.C. Circuit in
Maynard, the Ninth Circuit noted no distinction between short- and longterm surveillance. 121 Not only did law enforcement track Pineda-Moreno
three months longer than they tracked the defendant in Maynard, they
tracked him continuously during scores of trips, in contrast to the single
trip in Knotts. 122 Pineda-Moreno contended that surveillance conducted
“over an extended period of time” significantly affected the “amount,
quality and nature” of the information revealed. 123 The Ninth Circuit
declined to address this argument in its analysis of whether PinedaMoreno had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements. 124 In
addition to arguing that the prolonged duration of law enforcement’s
surveillance violated his reasonable expectation of privacy, PinedaMoreno also argued that the capabilities of GPS tracking technology
further distinguished the facts of Knotts from his case. 125
B.

GPS TECHNOLOGY VS. BEEPERS

The Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish between the technology used
in Knotts—a beeper—and the far more technologically advanced GPS
tracking devices used in Pineda-Moreno. 126 This distinction bears on the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Pineda-Moreno’s Fourth Amendment claim
because it reveals that GPS tracking is less like visual surveillance, as the
Ninth Circuit reasoned, 127 than the beeper tracking in Knotts. 128
120

See id. at 565.
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010). Instead of
addressing this distinction, the court addressed Pineda-Moreno’s argument that Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), had “heavily modified” analysis under the Fourth Amendment. In his
brief, Pineda-Moreno argued that Kyllo modified analysis of advanced technology under the Fourth
Amendment, including GPS. However, the court pointed out that in Kyllo law enforcement used
thermal imaging technology to acquire information from within a home—an area traditionally
accorded a much higher level of protection than a vehicle’s movements in public. Since the areas
considered in each case require two fundamentally different analyses, the court correctly rejected
Pineda-Moreno’s argument as a valid basis to grant his claim.
122
Compare Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213, 1216, with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 278-79 (1983).
123
Reply Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611262.
124
See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
125
See Reply Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611262.
126
See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
127
Id.
128
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983); see, e.g., State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d
217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (determining that GPS technology “does not merely augment the officers'
121
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The Ninth Circuit opined that law enforcement’s use of GPS to
track Pineda-Moreno’s movements over four months substituted for
visual surveillance, asserting that such an activity is “unequivocally not a
search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 129 In doing so,
the court cited Knotts, in which the Supreme Court similarly compared
beepers to an efficient form of visual surveillance. 130 While the Ninth
Circuit correctly observed that increased efficiency offered by GPS, or
even that of the less sophisticated Knotts beeper, does not automatically
mean that its use constitutes a search, 131 it does require a court to
approach it with greater caution. 132 Unlike the beeper in Knotts, the GPS
tracking technology in Pineda-Moreno was much more than a “modest
improvement over following a car by means of unaided human
vision.” 133
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning does not fully appreciate the nature of
the information revealed to law enforcement using GPS. Unlike beepers
and visual surveillance, GPS technology enables a form of prolonged
surveillance “that provides law enforcement with a comprehensive,
detailed, and lengthy record of someone’s movements.” 134 Unless police
resources were unlimited, creating such an extensive record of one’s
movements through physical visual surveillance would be impractical if
not impossible. 135 Unencumbered by the constraints of time, money, and
senses, but rather provides a technological substitute for traditional visual tracking”); United States
v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that GPS surveillance could be considered
either a high-tech “substitute for police surveillance” or a “more sophisticated beeper”); Renee
McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 409, 457 (2007) (recognizing that “beeper and GSP technology are fundamentally different in
terms of the quantity of information revealed by the science”); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS
Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of
the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 696 (2005) (arguing that GPS
surveillance reveals information that neither visual surveillance nor beeper-attendant surveillance
could gather).
129
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007)).
130
Id.
131
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
132
April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 696 (2005).
133
Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
134
April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 696 (2005).
135
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671
(2010) (“[P]ractical considerations prevent visual surveillance from lasting very long. Continuous
human surveillance for a week would require all the time and expense of several police officers,
while comparable photographic surveillance would require a net of video cameras so dense and so
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manpower, GPS tracking technology enables “a heretofore unknown
type of intrusion into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.” 136
Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s denial of
Pineda-Moreno’s petition for rehearing en banc recognized this
capability of GPS. 137 He explained that since a GPS device performs
tracking on its own and records its location—functions that beepers
lack—the devices law enforcement used in Pineda-Moreno are
completely unlike the primitive beepers used in Knotts. 138 The fantastic
capabilities of GPS devices allow them to “record the car’s movements
without human intervention—quietly, invisibly, with uncanny precision,”
creating “a permanent electronic record that can be compared, contrasted
and coordinated to deduce all manner of private information about
individuals.” 139 In this way, the GPS devices compile not only an
increased amount of information, but also a different type of information
by revealing personal details gleaned from patterns of movements over a
period of time. 140
In Pineda-Moreno, as in Maynard, law enforcement used the GPS
device not to track Pineda-Moreno’s movements from one place to
another, but to track his movements around-the-clock for an extended
period of time. 141 Consequently, the device continuously gathered
information as Pineda-Moreno traveled to dozens of places, allowing law
enforcement to discover the entirety of his movements and patterns as he

widespread as to catch a person’s every movement, plus the manpower to piece the photographs
together.”) “Constant and close surveillance” of a suspect, according to the former Chief of the
LAPD, is “not only more costly than any police department can afford, but in the vast majority of
cases it is impossible.” Id. at n.* (quoting W.H. Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictograph:
Threat or Protection? 42 CAL. L. REV. 727, 734 (1954)).
136
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565.
137
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
138
Id. at 1124.
139
Id.
140
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-65 (“A person who knows all of another’s travels can
deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful
husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political
groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.”); Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at
1125 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“By tracking and recording the
movements of millions of individuals the government can use computers to detect patterns and
develop suspicions. It can also learn a great deal about us because where we go says much about
who we are. Are Winston and Julia's cell phones together near a hotel a bit too often? Was Syme's
OnStar near an STD clinic? Were Jones, Aaronson and Rutherford at that protest outside the White
House?”); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 456 (2007) (explaining that GPS enables its user to collect an
increased quantity of information, which in turn affects the quality of information revealed).
141
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
EMMETT (FORMATTED).DOC

318

5/5/2011 5:03:21 PM

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

drove from place to place. 142 The GPS devices tracking Pineda-Moreno,
therefore, did not merely provide a record of his travels on public roads;
they provided four months worth of detail about his life, creating an
“intimate picture” 143 of his life. 144 As Pineda-Moreno explained in his
brief, GPS technology allowed law enforcement to acquire a type of
information about Pineda-Moreno that the public could not have
gathered through visual surveillance. 145 While he clearly was not
“‘imperceptible’ to others” when he was driving, “his exact location,
over an extended period of time, is information that is imperceptible
except through the use” 146 of the GPS tracking device. 147 The
accumulation of personal habits, travels and details easily inferred from
Pineda-Moreno’s exact locations over a prolonged time period revealed
much more information than merely his travels over public roads.
Like the Supreme Court in Knotts and the D.C. Circuit in Maynard,
the Ninth Circuit should have distinguished between short- and longterm surveillance and the technologies that enabled such surveillance.
After all, the use of GPS tracking technology is “most productive for law
enforcement, and most troublesome in constitutional terms, when it is
used over extended spans of time.” 148 Law enforcement’s prolonged and
unrelenting tracking of Pineda-Moreno stands in stark contrast to the
brief intrusion occasioned by police in Knotts. 149 Had the Ninth Circuit
considered the duration that Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle was under
142

See id. at 1216.
Several courts have recognized that prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture
of one’s life. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-65 (prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate
picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have-short perhaps of his spouse.); People v.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199-200 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that prolonged GPS monitoring yields “a
highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations—
political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the patterns of our
professional and avocational pursuits”); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003) (“In this
age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places that can reveal preferences,
alignments associations, personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these
travels, and thus can provide a detailed picture of one’s life.”); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS
Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of
the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 696 (2005) (commenting that
the capabilities of GPS tracking technology creates a “lengthy, detailed record of one’s location
[that] provides a comprehensive picture of one’s life”).
144
See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
145
Reply Brief of Appellant, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 08-30385), 2009 WL 4611262.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 463 (2007).
149
Compare United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213-14, 16 (9th Cir. 2010)
with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
143
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surveillance, and the technology used to track it, the court would have
found that he did not expose the “totality of his movements” to the public
over the course of four months. Thus, in tracking Pineda-Moreno’s
movements for four months, law enforcement’s conduct violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted a search.
IV. PINEDA-MORENO HAD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
IN THE TOTALITY OF HIS MOVEMENTS
Since law enforcement’s use of GPS tracking devices in PinedaMoreno amounted to a search, the reasonableness test set out in Katz
applies. 150 Application of the Katz test and its progeny to the facts of
Pineda-Moreno leads to one conclusion: society recognized as
reasonable Pineda-Moreno’s expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s
movements over the course of four months. Further, law enforcement
violated his reasonable expectation of privacy when it used GPS tracking
technology to monitor his travels continuously for four months.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision that Pineda-Moreno had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the totality of his movement centered largely on
the court’s application of the public-exposure doctrine to the facts of this
case. 151 The court determined that Pineda-Moreno exposed his travels to
the public by driving on public roads, thereby diminishing his
expectation of privacy. 152 Indeed, it is a well-established principle that
“[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle” because “a car
has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.” 153 After all, it is
unreasonable for law enforcement to avert their eyes from what an
individual exposes to the rest of the public. 154 However, when
considering GPS technology, the argument that an individual has no
expectation of privacy in his or her travels on public roads whatsoever
“misses the point.” 155 Prolonged GPS monitoring does not merely
provide a record of an individual’s movement on public roads; rather, it

150

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
152
Id.
153
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); see also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82; Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1978).
154
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking
Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public
Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 696 (2005).
155
April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 698 (2005).
151
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reveals an intimate picture of that person’s life. 156 It is in these personal
details accumulated throughout the totality of his or her movements that
a person reasonably expects privacy. 157
An inquiry into what a person “exposes to the public” involves
asking what a reasonable person might do, rather than what would be
reasonably and legally possible for a person to do. 158 The Supreme Court
has affirmed this approach in multiple cases. 159 For example, in Bond v.
United States, the Court held that a Border Patrol agent violated a bus
passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights when he physically manipulated
the passenger’s bag. 160 The Court explained that a bus passenger
undoubtedly expects that others may handle his bag, but he does not
expect others to feel his bag in an “exploratory manner.” 161 This
explanation encapsulated the idea that a court should focus on what a
reasonable person expects others might actually do, instead of what
others might theoretically do.
According to the D.C. Circuit, it is unreasonable for a person to
expect anyone to track and record for a prolonged period the collective
whole of his or her vehicle’s movements, much less each stop and the

156

See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563-65 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
671 (2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology:
The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under
the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 698 (2005); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 419 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007) (“In the
case of GPS-enabled tracking, it is this aggregation of substantial amounts of personal data that
makes the limitless use of the technology constitutionally troublesome.”).
157
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563-65 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
671 (2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology:
The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under
the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 698 (2005); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 419 UCLA L. REV. 409, 457 (2007) (“In the
case of GPS-enabled tracking, it is this aggregation of substantial amounts of personal data that
makes the limitless use of the technology constitutionally troublesome.”).
158
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559.
159
See, e.g., id.; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (“Here, the inspection was made
from a helicopter, but as is the case with fixed-wing planes, ‘private and commercial flight [by
helicopter] in the public airways is routine’ in this country, and there is no indication that such
flights are unheard of in Pasco County, Florida.” (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215)); Greenwood,
486 U.S. at 40 (“It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public
street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public.”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214-15 (1986) (holding defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in location that “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace
who glanced down could have seen everything these officers observed”).
160
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
161
Id.
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corresponding inferences. 162 Instead, a person expects each of his or her
movements “to remain disconnected and anonymous.” 163 When the
Supreme Court wrote in Knotts that the vehicle driver exposed his
movements to “anyone who wanted to look,” 164 it merely summarized
the notion “that one in public normally experiences a series of fleeting
glances by a variety of individuals over time.” 165 Therefore, the inquiry
whether someone exposes his or her actions or location to the public
should not depend on theoretical probabilities; instead, it should center
around the “actual likelihood of discovery by a stranger.” 166 Applying
this analytical framework to Pineda-Moreno reveals that while he was
subject to fleeting glances from various individuals, he did not expose
the totality of his movements to the public.
Indeed, Pineda-Moreno exposed each of his movements to others by
driving on public roads. After all, by going outside, Pineda-Moreno was
not imperceptible to others. However, in actuality, he did not expose the
totality of his movements over the course of four months to the public
because “the likelihood that a stranger would observe all those
movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.” 167 Like physical
manipulation of the carry-on bag in Bond, the extended and surreptitious
recordation of Pineda-Moreno’s movements was not what he reasonably
expected anyone to do. 168 The combination of GPS tracking capabilities
coupled with prolonged monitoring prevented his movements from
remaining “disconnected and anonymous.” 169 Consequently, it was not
162

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671

(2010).
163

Id. (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J.,
concurring)).
164
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
165
April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 696 (2005).
166
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560.
167
Id.; see also Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 453 (2007) (“While individuals understand that portions
of their route may be observed by others, it is unlikely that most people contemplate a
comprehensive mapping of their whereabouts over a span of weeks or even months, including the
location of each stop and the duration of every trip segment.”); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 507, 547-48 (2005) (advocating a “limited third party” approach to Fourth Amendment
doctrine, noting that a driver “conveys his or her position to pedestrians and other drivers to avoid an
accident. [However,] most drivers would not think they were conveying their entire driving route to
bystanders.”).
168
See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).
169
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772
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reasonable for Pineda-Moreno to expect every single movement to be
secretly and continuously recorded for four months. 170 Pineda-Moreno
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of his movements
over four months. Thus, the actions of law enforcement in continuously
monitoring his location were subject to the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.
V.

A PROPOSED ANALYSIS THAT ACCOUNTS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL’S
PRIVACY INTERESTS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s publicexposure doctrine, particularly the analysis of that doctrine in United
States v. Knotts, undermined its opinion in Pineda-Moreno. Specifically,
the Pineda-Moreno court did not account for the privacy interest at stake
when the government utilizes advanced technology, like GPS tracking, to
conduct comprehensive surveillance of an individual. This Note
proposes an approach to this issue that preserves the privacy guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment while comporting with the public-exposure
doctrine, regardless of what new technologies law enforcement utilizes.
This analysis involves two steps: first, the court should recognize the
inherent limitations of the Knotts holding; second, when determining
whether an individual had a justifiable expectation of privacy in his or
her movements, the court should evaluate law enforcement’s activity in
light of what a reasonable person would expect others might actually do.
Refining an analysis of the public-exposure doctrine in Knotts
requires that courts recognize the limitations of that holding. In doing so,
courts will be able to determine the validity of a Fourth Amendment
claim without prematurely ending the analysis. The Supreme Court has
not addressed the monitoring of GPS signals under the Fourth
Amendment; 171 therefore, Knotts is not controlling on the issue. 172
(N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)).
170
See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; see also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; April A.
Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the
Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661,
696 (2005).
171
April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 674 (2005); see Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The Government Knows Where
You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 103, 107 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has made no decision regarding GPS
technology).
172
See Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 453 (2007) (concluding that the constitutionality of GPS
surveillance is not governed by Knotts for two reasons: first, the Knotts Court limited its decision to
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Because of its limited scope, the Knotts holding only provides guidance
in the approach courts should take to their application of the publicexposure doctrine.
An individual does not relinquish all of his or her privacy merely by
stepping outside. 173 The Court’s decision in Knotts reflects this principle
because it merely held that a driver has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another; 174 it did not hold
that he or she has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
whatsoever. 175 After all, protecting people—not places—is the aim of
the Fourth Amendment. 176 Thus, a refined analysis of an individual’s
privacy interest under the public-exposure doctrine should recognize that
an individual who moves about in public does not knowingly expose to
others (including law enforcement) the whole of his or her movements
and the information that can be inferred from such movements. 177
Instead, by “walking or driving in public,” a person only “knowingly
exposes to others bits and pieces of his movements and activities.” 178
Evaluating the extent of law enforcement’s intrusion during its
surveillance helps determine whether an individual had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Furthermore, examining the quantity and type of
information uncovered by the technology is significant to this analysis.
In the case of Pineda-Moreno, this would have involved the
consideration of the duration of the electronic surveillance and the
technology that enabled it. With an eye toward an individual’s practical
expectations of what others might do, considering the accessibility of the
technology, the extent of its use and the degree of resulting intrusion, a
court can decide a Fourth Amendment case on its own facts, and “not by
extravagant generalizations” 179 about the technology used. In this way, a
court will thoroughly analyze an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy and objectively determine whether he or she exposed his or her
resolve only the question of the permissible use of beepers, thereby avoiding the issue of twentyfour-hour surveillance of individuals; second, and most importantly, “beeper and GPS technology
are fundamentally different in terms of the quantity of information revealed by the science”).
173
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[W]hat
[one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”).
174
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1983).
175
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
176
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (holding that application of the Fourth Amendment does not
require trespass over physical boundaries).
177
April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 674 (2005).
178
Id.
179
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986).
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movements to the public. The result of this analysis ensures that courts
will adhere to the public-exposure doctrine while protecting individuals’
privacy in the Information Age.
The Supreme Court has recognized that law enforcement’s
utilization of more advanced forms of technology threatens to diminish
the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 180 To avoid this,
courts should “take the long view, from the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment forward,” 181 so as to protect the rights and privacy
interests of the public. 182 While courts cannot read the Fourth
Amendment as confining law enforcement to the technology and tactics
available in the eighteenth century, 183 privacy concerns raised by
fantastic technological advances oblige the Supreme Court to watch
closely to safeguard fairness in the federal court system. 184 Federal
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, share that burden with the Supreme
Court when they face Fourth Amendment claims involving advanced
technologies.
CONCLUSION

Pineda-Moreno highlights the convergence between Fourth
Amendment protections and advanced technology that enables law
enforcement to easily access individuals’ personal information. In its
analysis of this complex legal intersection, the Ninth Circuit was not
sufficiently alert to the issue the Supreme Court reserved in Knotts:
whether prolonged twenty-four-hour electronic surveillance of an
individual constitutes a search. Instead, the Ninth Circuit based its
decision on the assumption that the Supreme Court had decided that
issue. 185 As a result, the court prematurely rejected Pineda-Moreno’s
Fourth Amendment claim without analyzing whether he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the collective pattern of his movements over a
four-month period. Close consideration of both the duration of the
electronic monitoring and the GPS technology that enabled the
surveillance would have revealed that law enforcement obtained
information of a type that was not available to the public through simple
(or even technologically enhanced) visual surveillance. Thus, law
enforcement’s use of GPS technology to monitor Pineda-Moreno’s
180

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
Id. at 40.
182
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
183
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
184
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
185
See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
181
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movements over the course of four months constituted a search because
it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.
Pineda-Moreno presents an argument for the placement of
constitutional limitations on GPS tracking. The Supreme Court has
recognized that “the Constitution requires the sacrifice of neither security
nor liberty.” 186 In other words, society should not have to surrender
personal privacy at the feet of technology’s progress.
Instead,
technological advancements should increase the judiciary’s appreciation
for the role of personal privacy in society, so as to spark its desire to
manage it. After all, the GPS devices in Pineda-Moreno’s case “are just
advance ripples to a tidal wave of technological assaults on our
privacy.” 187
CAITLIN EMMETT 

186

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
 J.D. Candidate, 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, Cal.; B.A.
International Studies, 2009, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz.; Ninth Circuit Survey Articles
Editor (2011-2012), Golden Gate University Law Review. I dedicate this Note to my grandmother,
Jerry, in recognition of her immeasurable wisdom and grace. I wish to thank my family for their
encouragement, with special thanks to Luke for his steadfast love and support. I owe a debt of
gratitude to Ed Baskauskas and the 2010-2011 Editorial Board for their invaluable guidance.
187

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

27

